Post by masders on Feb 15, 2024 4:29:39 GMT
he I2P network is one of the implementations of the invisible internet project. The network provides stable anonymity for both clients and servers, which makes it possible to hide not only the fact of access to a number of sites, but also the sites themselves in this network in such a way that law enforcement agencies will not be able to determine the exact location of the server. The notorious site RusLeaks (Russian analogue of the WikiLeaks project) was moved to the I2P network as soon as pressure from the authorities appeared. The network itself is distributed and encrypted and functions independently of the Internet (you can “deploy” this network inside a local network without access to the Internet, but other than academic interest this does not represent any practical value).
The I2P network operates on top of the Andorra Email List transport layer of the OSI model, which slightly violates the OSI ideology, but that is the idea: from the point of view of an outside observer, only encrypted traffic (similar to random garbage and having a high degree of entropy) with different nodes is visible. Along with the Tor software, a chain of nodes is used for anonymization. The difference between I2P and Tor is that the latter uses a chain of proxy servers that transfer their public keys to the client for encryption, and the client encrypts the message in such a way that the first proxy.
Having decrypted this message, knows about the second proxy, the second knows about the next one, and the most the latter knows the original, unencrypted message, but does not have information about who sent this message. This is called Onion routing. In the I2P network, several so-called tunnels are built for each peer (similar to the proxy chain in Tor); such tunnels are of two types: input and output. To organize a connection between nodes, it first searches for the input tunnel of the target node, and then connects its output tunnel to it. Moreover, the tunnels in this network are short-lived and last no longer than ten minutes. Peers do not communicate directly with each other, with the exception of: building those same tunnels and asking certain intermediaries about the input tunnels of the target node.
The I2P network operates on top of the Andorra Email List transport layer of the OSI model, which slightly violates the OSI ideology, but that is the idea: from the point of view of an outside observer, only encrypted traffic (similar to random garbage and having a high degree of entropy) with different nodes is visible. Along with the Tor software, a chain of nodes is used for anonymization. The difference between I2P and Tor is that the latter uses a chain of proxy servers that transfer their public keys to the client for encryption, and the client encrypts the message in such a way that the first proxy.
Having decrypted this message, knows about the second proxy, the second knows about the next one, and the most the latter knows the original, unencrypted message, but does not have information about who sent this message. This is called Onion routing. In the I2P network, several so-called tunnels are built for each peer (similar to the proxy chain in Tor); such tunnels are of two types: input and output. To organize a connection between nodes, it first searches for the input tunnel of the target node, and then connects its output tunnel to it. Moreover, the tunnels in this network are short-lived and last no longer than ten minutes. Peers do not communicate directly with each other, with the exception of: building those same tunnels and asking certain intermediaries about the input tunnels of the target node.